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Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature?
Mark Kingwell*
Many recent debates about interpretation of the law, familiar to students
of legal theory, are determined by a rather simple question-the one I take
as my title here-which has, surprisingly, received little explicit attention.
These debates are vexed and complex, and have been exacerbated by the
personalities of some participants and the professional jealousy aroused by
real or imagined transgressions of disciplinary boundaries. More seriously,
the recent entry-or, as some would have it, the infiltration-of contempo-
rary literary and interpretive theory into the realm of law has vastly
complicated the issues. Those issues include: the proper role of intention
in legal documents, especially the Constitution; the relevance or redeem-
ability of claims to truth and objectivity in legal interpretation; the law's
epistemological and moral status; and, ultimately, the relevance of legal
theory itself to the practice of law.
These questions were not absent from the minds of lawyers and legal
scholars before the current groundswell of theoretical interest. The study
of legal hermeneutics, including much abstract and subtle theorizing about
textual indeterminacy, has a long and honorable history--one longer,
arguably, than that enjoyed by the study of literary interpretation.1 The
"infiltration" problem is that the controversies, innovations, and philosoph-
ical questioning of one realm of study-contemporary literary theory-have
been translated, and have even proliferated, when similar concerns were
raised in the realm of law. The so-called "law and literature" movement
* I would like to thank Gail Donaldson, Todd Ducharme, Matthew Parfitt, and Catherine Vacke
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. This paper was written with the generous assistance of a
postdoctoral research fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
1. Together with Biblical and philological scholarship, legal study provided the controversial texts
that prompted the first study of general interpretive theory by German scholars in the early nineteenth
century. See Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, Introduction to THE HERMENEUTICS READER 1 (Kurt Meuller-
Vollmer ed., 1990). James Farr demonstrates that the German style of theorizing about texts was alive
early on this continent. James Farr, The Americanization of Hermeneutics: Francis Leiber's LEGAL AND
POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 83-102
(Gregory Leyh ed., 1992). Leiber, a Prussian immigrant to the United States, published the first edition
of his work in 1837.
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and its attendant debates are the legacy of this proliferation. Most of the
current debates, however, can be organized around divergences and
confusion concerning the analogy between law and literature. Ultimately,
we still need to decide how similar are the concerns of legal and literary
theory. Do they speak to the same subjects? In what ways is law really
like literature?
That is the central question, and though it is indeed a rather simple one,
we cannot pretend that it has a simple answer. Nor can we expect, for
related reasons, a definitive answer. All available answers to the analogy
question, including the one offered in this article, are complicated by
various dimensions of indeterminacy, disagreement, and simple cognitive
failure. That is, it may prove no easier to answer-in a dispute-ending
way-whether law is like literature than it is to say what art is, or what
constitutes the good life, or whether a person is trustworthy. Indeed, one
of the virtues of asking the analogy question explicitly is that it shows us
the problem with our desire for a simple and definitive answer to the
question. Having thus hinted at a paradox, let me confirm the hint and
offer a blunt answer to the analogy question: law is utterly like literature;
it is utterly unlike literature; and, in the end, the question of analogy hardly
matters.
The question hardly matters, yet it remains significant. Why? Because,
it drives a concern shared by many-ranging from those (like Ronald
Dworkin) who think law very much like literature to those (like Richard
Posner) who think it very much unlike-to find a plausible general theory
of legal interpretation. The motive to find such a theory derives from the
even more general desire to distill clear meaning from legal texts. Such
meaning can take many forms, and there is a bewildering variety of
opinions on its status; but, in general, people concerned with the question
wish there to be something like the "valid" or "correct" or "true" or even
"objective" meaning of legal texts. Just what that something is, and how
valid or correct or true it needs to be, are questions that take us into the
heart of recent law-and-literature controversies. What we will find in
exploring these controversies is that a general theory of interpretation is
indeed available, a theory that is both interesting and useful in under-
standing the status of the law. Whether such a theory additionally secures
"true" meaning, or is useful in guiding the practices of legal interpretation,
are distinct questions, and I will take them up only in the final section of
this paper.
To get to that point, I will proceed as follows. The first section assesses
several controversies that have become familiar in recent debates over legal
interpretation, in particular, the set of allegedly all-or-nothing choices that
seem to define the theoretical discussions of law. These debates clarify the
stakes in the analogy question. Next I examine, in sharper focus, various
versions of the analogy argument: the claims that there are (or are not)
[Vol. 6: 317
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significant similarities between law and literature. My argument here will
be that the question has, for the most part, remained inexplicit. In the rare
instances where it has been asked explicitly, the answer has been clouded
by what the inquirer imagines "the other side" to be saying. In the third
section, I attempt both to sketch the outlines of a superior general theory
of interpretation and to suggest its limitations. These limitations lead us
back to the fundamental questions, broached in the fourth section, that are
ever in the background of this discussion: Can truth ever be secured in
interpretation? Does interpretive theory represent the only way to secure
it?
I. THE FORKS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION
Students of interpretive theory in law are familiar with the experience of
being asked to make a series of choices as they consider the meaning of a
legal text. Each of the choices comes with a label, and writers in the field
invite readers, in effect, to pledge their allegiance: positivist or non-
positivist; interpretivist or noninterpretivist; intentionalist or formalist;
originalist or contextualist; determinist or indeterminist; objectivist or
perspectivist; foundationalist or pragmatist. To add to the confusion, and
to the reader's sense of being put-upon, these choices frequently overlap
and seep into one another. Is being a positivist the same as being an
intrepretivist? Can a pragmatist be an originalist? Disputes over
entailment are also endemic: When is an originalist also an intentionalist?
Always? Never? Sometimes? Supporters of the various parties, who very
much want the reader to choose, may elevate the stakes to make the
choices starker. If we are not objectivists or foundationalists, they might
say, chaos will be loosed upon the law. Nietzschean nihilism (or
skepticism, or indeterminacy, or quietism) will reign.2 Society will
crumble. If, on the other hand, we are not, say, contextualists, we risk
supporting the tyranny of reason, the chilly determinacy of the dominant
world view, the devastation of empire and capital, or simply fascism. The
tropes for writing about legal interpretation can often be reduced to two:
the fork and the specter. The fork demands that one choose this path or the
2. It is fascinating to note how often Nietzsche gets the blame for loosing nihilism upon the world
and ushering in the era of textual indeterminacy. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, in
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEuTIC READER 155-73 (Sanford Levinson & Steven
Mailloux eds., 1988). An effective reply is made in the same volume by Richard Weisberg, who
demonstrates the well-balanced character of Nietzsche's views on interpretation. Richard Weisberg, On
the Use and Abuse of Nietzsche for Modern Constitutional Theory, in id. at 181-92. Richard Posner,
in Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relationship, makes a similar point-after an egregiously
oversimplified reading of Nietzsche in Chapter 3-when he notes that Nietzsche's views on textual
coherence endorse the conservative New Critical position in literary criticism. RICHARD POSNER, LAW
AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP 219 (1988). But there is a convincing case that
for Nietzsche, nihilism means not that there is no meaning in the world, but rather that all the meaning
we have is of human origin. I owe this point to Randall Havas.
1994] 319
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other; the specter suggests the vision of disastrous consequence, fear of
which is supposed to ensure that one will make the right choice.
The stakes are rarely as serious as the specters would suggest, and it is
tempting to agree with Stanley Fish that the choices, and the labels, are of
mainly rhetorical and political import.3 But we should resist taking Fish's
next step, namely, that the theoretical consideration of these questions has
no bearing on the practices of legal interpretation. How we pledge
ourselves-what we understand ourselves to be doing when we engage in
textual interpretation-will affect both the kinds of interpretations we
produce and the status we take those interpretations to have. Indeed, Fish's
kind of reductionism, which sees most of these fraught debates as
nonexistent, has the unfortunate effect of leaving everything as it is and
reducing theoretical reflection to no more than a pleasant parlor game.
That he would not regard this effect as unfortunate, indeed that he would
not regard it as an effect, is consistent with Fish's urge--one he holds in
common with many other sophisticated thinkers, usually influenced by
Wittgenstein-to cure us of certain desires for theory. These include the
desires to draw distinctions and to force choices in an effort to say how
things really are in the world. It is undeniable that this set of desires,
which can go by the shorthand name of "philosophy," has exerted a hold
on us; it is also true that Fish's practice-based account of legal inter-
pretation is attractive in many respects.4 Yet, ultimately, his efforts at
intellectual therapy-the attempt to get us, as Wittgenstein put it, to stop
scratching where it does not itch-simply lead to one more fork in the legal
theory road: theorist or therapist.
Before assessing that fork, and suggesting how we can detour around it,
I will briefly examine the most influential of the other forks. Though there
are many complexities in the debate surrounding these choices, I hope to
provide enough detail to clarify the stakes in the central question of
analogy between law and literature. I also hope to avoid exposure to
another argumentative trope common in debates over interpretive theory,
the one played out in reply to someone who attempts to "overcome" certain
canonical distinctions: the charge here is that by refusing to take the fork
seriously, one wants to have his cake and eat it too. The fork is thus
reinstated as a choice between "thinking clearly"-that is, thinking
dichotomously-or not. Yet the charge fails to hit the mark; although there
are indeed choices to be made in interpretive theory, they rarely involve the
all-or-nothing propositions suggested by the forks.
3. Stanley Fish, Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law, in LEGAL HERMENETICS, supra note 1,
at 297-316.
4. The extended defense of the practice-based account, including our practice-relative notions of
truth and correctness, is explored at greater length in STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?
THE ATrHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980), and DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:
CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989).
320 [Vol. 6: 317
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The two most influential forks posed for the practice of interpreta-
tion-as opposed to forks concerning the status of interpretations, or the
status of the law itself-arise out of different scholarly contexts. The
interpretivism/noninterpretivism debate is a legacy of legal debate, while
the intentionalism/formalism debate is a direct inheritance from literary
criticism, especially the American criticism that was influential during the
middle part of this century, the so-called New Criticism. Cynical
observers, reflecting on the origin of these debates, have found it amusing
that lawyers found themselves able to advance a theory of interpretation
that denies the value of interpretation as most of us understand it-and to
call that theory, perversely, interpretivism.
In general terms, interpretivism is the view that adjudication is a matter
of reading a legal text (a statute, a founding document like the U.S.
Constitution, or even a body of precedents) and rendering a decision that
tries to express simply "what the law says." According to this view, judges
"should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly
implicit in the written Constitution."5 In the judgment of Mark Tushnet,
interpretivism is one of "[t]he two leading constitutional theories" in
contemporary legal circles.6 And, indeed, it has a straightforward appeal:
What else could adjudication be but restating what the law says? The real
problem of interpretivism is that "statements" or "clear implications" in
legal texts are in practice limited to a very small number of noncontro-
versial (read "nonpolitical") clauses of legal writing. Thus, in practice, as
Owen Fiss remarks, interpretivism is really a kind of legal determinism: it
draws a (usually undefended) distinction between the controversial and the
uncontroversial, and purports to speak only of the latter, and to do so "in
plain terms." Fiss is correct in saying that this distinction is itself a
controversial interpretive property, and that since interpretivism of this sort
is necessarily committed to a pre-reflective view of what the law is, it is
inherently deterministic.'
Some commentators, attacking the determinism of interpretivist stances,
have gone so far as to argue that even apparently uncontroversial
clauses-such as the Constitution's Article II injunction that the president
be at least 35 years of age-are themselves open to interpretation. That the
president should "have the maturity and station in life of an average 35-
5. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1980).
6. The other is the "neutral principles" view, which Tushnet suggests is equally misleading. See
Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,
96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983), reprinted in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 193.
Tushnet's critique of these "programmatic" or "rule-driven" theories constitutes a negative argument
in favor of a hermeneutic alternative. See id. at 199-203.
7. Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982), reprinted in
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 232. For a more detailed discussion of the
objectivity issue, see KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY (1992).
19941
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year-old" is, for example, one possible interpretation suggested by this
clause. Posner is the most vocal of interpretivist-style critics of this
interpretation. The interpretation is implausible, he says, because Article
II is meant to be merely an arbitrary cutoff. But this "merely" is charged:
Posner will not be bothered to ask both what the clause says and what it
means-that is, he will not interpret it as well as read it.8 We can agree
that the limit is simply an arbitrary and fixed cutoff (we are not asking for
exemptions for some exceptionally mature 30-year-olds) and argue that its
meaning is discerned only in some account of maturity and resources.
Strict interpretivism, however, shuts down ex ante this effort to secure
meaning, leaving us, in this case, with a clause whose very arbitrariness,
unless unpacked in interpretation, can appear simply authoritarian and
prejudicial.
Interpretivism can also be considered a species of legal positivism, for
it claims to treat the law as if it were an object of quasi-scientific study,
something that will cough up its relevant truths when subject to the proper
methods of impartial judicial investigation. 9 Two familiar slogans from
legal theory clarify the specter that is thought to motivate the choice of
interpretivism. Interpretivists want a law that is found, not made, and they
want a government of laws, not one of men. Noninterpretivists, for their
part, question the validity of interpretivist judicial decisionmaking, arguing
that interpretivists may misconstrue the law in their efforts to treat it as
what Richard Rorty has called "a lump"-that is, as a preexisting, uncondi-
tioned something that lies, without any prior determination by human
concerns, waiting to be examined.'0 In addition, by refusing to grapple
with parts of legal texts that are controversial, interpretivists in effect
obviate the role of adjudication. We do not have judges just to provide
interpretations of the apparently plain--even recognizing that plainness can
be deceiving. Interpretivism is therefore an inaccurate picture both of the
8. See Mark Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 683 (1985); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985).
Posner criticizes these two "critical legal studies" thinkers for their attempt to bring the "skepticism"
of literary interpretation, especially deconstruction, to statutory interpretation. See POSNER, supra note
2, at 219-20, 242.
9. It is not, for that reason, a legal realist position, since it remains committed to interpreting the
text of the law as what Fiss misleadingly calls "objective." Realist objections to this enterprise come
in old and new forms: the political realism of the early twentieth century and what Fiss calls the
"nihilist" realism of the late twentieth century, both of which claim that judicial adjudication is about
power, not objective legitimacy. See Fiss, supra note 7, at 230. But, as I attempt to show in the final
section of this paper, the issue poses another false choice. We can both recognize the role of politics
in adjudication and preserve all the claims to legitimacy necessary to uphold the legal practices
associated with it.
10. RICHARD RORTY, Texts and Lumps, in OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 78-92 (1991).
The other essays in that volume continue the defense of Rorty's views on "anti-representational-
ism"-an account "which does not view knowledge as a matter of getting reality right, but rather as a
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law and of judicial decisionmaking. Taken as a normative picture, it will
skew judicial reading of the Constitution or other statutes and render the
law irrelevant in the face of changing social conditions.
The choice between interpretivism and noninterpretivism is really no
choice at all. Lawyers will sometimes speak as if there were a genuine
decision to be made about whether judicial decisionmaking can be
interpretive, but in fact judges-like readers-are interpreting all the time,
whether they like it or not. From this point of view, interpretivism is really
just a rather strict and old-fashioned school of interpretation, one that is
further impaired by insufficient self-awareness. The notions of
uncontroversial clauses and "plain speaking" are red herrings that, at best,
obscure the contextual features of a practice that make some elements of
a text less problematic than others; at worst, these notions conceal a
political agenda that is conservative in nature." Moreover, as develop-
ments in the philosophy of science make more and more investigative
practices appear less positivistic, the appeal to standards of scientific
"lump" examination makes less and less sense.' 2 On these matters, Fiss
claims in his paper "Objectivity and Interpretation" that interpretivism is no
longer a serious choice for students of legal interpretation; nonetheless, he
organizes his opening remarks around the issue of whether adjudication is
indeed interpretation, suggesting that the question (if not the choice) is still
a live one.'
3
The interpretivism/noninterpretivism fork has a strong bearing on the
analogy question because it may suggest, as Fiss puts it, the possibility of
an "essential unity between law and the humanities."'" The clue here is
a broadening of the notion of text, which, Fiss says correctly, is now
applied to almost every aspect of life. Hermeneutics has long insisted on
the essential similarity between texts in the usual sense, which is to say
books and other written documents, and what are called text-analogues.
11. The issue is similar to the one conjured up when people claim that the "politicization" of the
law (or some other social practice, e.g., the academy) is illicit. Being honest about the political stakes
of a practice is not tantamount to reducing it to plays of power-the usual specter in view here. On
the contrary, refusing to acknowledge political elements of a practice capitulates to whatever politics
are then dominant, and that in itself is a political act. "If someone agrees with us on the aims and uses
of culture, we think him objective," the critic Robert Hughes notes; "if not, we accuse him of
politicizing the debate." ROBERT HUGHES, CULTURE OF COMPLAINT: THE FRAYING OF AMERICA 60
(1993).
12. This point has become a commonplace with the expanding influence of Kuhnian philosophy
of science, which emphasizes the practice-based elements of scientific investigation and lays to rest
many of the axiological excesses of the Enlightenment view. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). Despite important divergences, Kuhn's work has affinities, interesting
for the present point, with the work of W.V.O. Quine and Donald Davidson. See especially Davidson's
influential essay On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in POST-ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 129-44
(John Rajchman and Comel West eds., 1985).
13. Fiss, supra note 7.
14. Id. at 230. Fiss's point seems to be that this unity, if real, would allow the application of
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Text-analogues may be spoken words, rituals, practices, non-verbal
artworks, even a definable set of political or moral values. Indeed, the
thrust of philosophical hermeneutics, especially as practiced by Martin
Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, is that all aspects of human
life-what we may simply call "the meaningful"-are relevantly addressed
as texts by a general interpretive theory. Overcoming the non-choice
between interpretivism and noninterpretivism, which has confused the issue
with its narrow commitments concerning the uncontroversial, opens us to
the possibility that all adjudication is indeed interpretation. 5 The relevant
texts will be the statutes, defining documents, and precedents of the legal
practice to which we belong. The relevant question to ask of ourselves as
interpreters will not be whether or not we are interpreting, but rather what
commitments we bring to the task of interpretation, and how defensible
they are.
Fiss is right in saying that adjudication is always interpretation. Whether
this general statement actually confirms an essential unity between law and
the humanities is, however, a separate question. Fiss moves too easily from
one to the other, and he does so because, like many legal theorists, he has
not paused to examine the analogy issue in detail. Because law and
literature both involve generally accessible written texts, it is perhaps too
easy to assume an analogy on the level of interpretive principle. The
proliferation of texts and text-analogues makes the question an easy one to
elide, but we cannot allow it to remain so.
The intentionalism/formalism fork explains why. Put crudely, this fork
poses a choice between those who are willing to take authorial intention
into account and those who claim to be unwilling. In legal theory, it is
closely related to the interpretivism/noninterpretivism fork because many,
if not most, so-called interpretivists are strong proponents of intentionalism:
they argue that the clarity of clear Constitutional statements (or clearly
implicit messages) can be recovered only by examining the historical record
and accounts of the Constitution's writing to discern, or anyway to imagine,
the Framers' intent.1 6 The nonintentionalist side of the choice, associated
15. For a contrary view, from a perspective sympathetic to the Critical Legal Studies movement,
see Robin West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations about the Law-as-Literature
Movement, 54 TENN. L. REv. 203 (1987).
16. Tushnet argues that the link between intention and interpretation can only be maintained by a
commitment to "flawed historiographical methods," especially in viewing authorial intention as divorced
from "social and conceptual context." See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down, in INTERPRETING
LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 198. We might be interested in distinguishing here between
intentionalism tout court and originalism, the doctrine that interpretation is validated by reconstruction
of (in this case) the Framers' original intentions. Some literary intentionalists, like Hirsch, are not
originalists; in their view, this reconstruction is impossible and attempts at it lead to antiquarian
fallacies. For a good discussion of the various options in legal interpretation, see Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980), reprinted in
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 69. Terence Ball offers some novel anti-
intentionalist arguments, showing that conceptual change makes genuine reconstruction impossible.
324 (Vol. 6: 317
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with certain well-worn positions in literary criticism (Wimsatt, Beardsley,
Brooks et al.), is formalist in the sense that it suggests the only relevant
criteria of interpretation are those that inhere in the work itself: the work
considered, in the language of these authors, as a kind of artifact, a "verbal
icon" or indeed a "well wrought urn.' 7  Authorial intention is irrelevant
to formalist critics because it cannot reveal anything about the success or
failure of the work in terms of its formal perfection, its achievement of
aesthetic goals concerning, say, coherence and uniformity of effect. Indeed,
the notion of "recoverable intention" is thought by some to be a
chimera-inaccessible, even imaginary, and only claimed when one has
achieved a satisfactory interpretation on other grounds. 18 Literary critics
committed to some form of intentionalism (like E.D. Hirsch, Jr.) argue, by
contrast, that no text can be fully understood without assessing what the
author intended it to mean.'9 For these critics the text is a kind of
message, something that we could in principle ask the author to repeat or
expand upon in line with what he meant to say. Reading the text, as a
result, involves placing it in the context of those (usually counterfactually
presumed or historically reconstructed) authorial intentions.20  At this
point, formalists often reply that if authorial intentions have any bearing at
all, they will be realized in the text itself and will not have to be sought in
biographical, historical, or otherwise extraneous information.
The remarkable persistence of the intentionalism/formalism debate has
overshadowed numerous commonalities between the two positions,
positions which, I will argue, collapse into each other. As before, the
Terence Bell, Constitutional Interpretation and Conceptual Change, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS, supra
note 1, at 129-46.
17. Two essays by W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley are considered ground zero of formalist
literary criticism. They are "The Intentional Fallacy" (1946) and "The Affective Fallacy" (1949), both
included in W.K. WIMSATr, THE VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY (1954). The
essays argue that authorial intentions and states of mind, as well as affective responses excited in the
reader, are irrelevant to the objective judgment of aesthetic objects. Less uncompromising, but
committed to the same goal, is Cleanth Brooks's close formalist reading of a collection of well-known
poems in CLEANTH BROOKS, THE WELL WROUGHT URN: STUDIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF POETRY
(1947).
18. I thank Matthew Parfitt for sharpening this point. Formalists, of course, are not the only critics
who reject intention as a criterion of assessment in interpretation. This is one reason the fork does not
represent a genuine choice.
19. See, e.g., E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967); E.D. HIRSCH, JR., THE AIMS
OF INTERPRETATION (1976). These works constitute the most sustained recent defense of an "intentiona-
list" position in literary interpretation.
20. Hirsch makes a convincing case for the role of counterfactuals in usefully recovering intentions.
See E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Counterfactuals in Interpretation, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra
note 2, at 55-68. He suggests that "[i]nterpreters sometimes need to imagine what a text would mean
if it were authored in the present." Without this awareness, the text is reduced to its present meaning
in what he labels an "irresponsible reading." But taking this counterfactual awareness too seriously can
lead to what Paul Brest calls "the misconceived quest for the original understanding," or the fallacies
of antiquarianism or strict originalism. Brest, supra note 16, at 69. The problems of accurate historical
reconstruction of intention have been much remarked; Hirsch's counterfactual account is free of most
of them, and indeed closer to the model of interpretation I defend in Section III of the present paper.
1994]
9
Kingwell: Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature?
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1994
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
debate represents not so much a genuine choice as another fork in the
rhetorical road. And once again, this fact has important consequences for
the question of whether law is like literature.
A clue to the commonalities is provided by the unsatisfactory nature of
extreme versions of the fork. There have recently been critics who felt no
compunction in declaring the author-conceived as a locus of inten-
tion-dead, his or her texts no more (but, of course, no less) than nodes of
textuality in a great linked chain of writing and reading." On the other
side, certain interpreters of some texts-legal texts perhaps among
them-claim that formal or aesthetic criteria are entirely irrelevant to the
meaningfulness of a message.22 The first position appears to destroy the
really interesting fact about texts, namely, that in them someone is trying
to say something to someone else. The second position appears to ignore
that no text can be meaningful unless it follows some formal criteria, shared
between author and reader, that combine to render the text readable.
The specters conjured up by the respective parties also differ, but they
are united on another common theme: the other side's interpretations are
subject to error and distortion, and hence loss of validity. Formalists think
that opening the door to the evidence of intention will lead to impression-
ism, subjectivism, and even relativism. At the same time intentionalists,
many of whom find their bogeymen in more contemporary literary
criticism, think that taking close account of intention is the only way to halt
a different form of impressionism and relativism, the kind threatened in
"reader-response" criticism or (a favorite bugbear of the late 1980s)
deconstruction.23
21. The "death of the author" claim, now much abused, is associated most closely with the French
critic and philosopher Roland Barthes. See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, WRITING DEGREE ZERO (1967);
ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY (1968); ROLAND BARTHES, NEW CRITICAL ESSAYS
(1980); ROLAND BARTHES, THE SEMIOTIC CHALLENGE (1988). Barthes's central argument is that a text
must be interpreted only in terms of its textual functions, that is, wholly apart from truth values and
from any concern with the irrelevant figure of the author. Echoes of this position are audible in
deconstruction's emphasis on indeterminacy in textual meaning and intertextuality (i.e., the claim that
"there is nothing outside the text"). For a helpful discussion of deconstruction's relevance to legal
interpretation, see Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy,
and the Temptation of the New Formalism, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POsSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 152-
210 (David Gray Carlson et al. eds., 1992).
22. Posner is one such interpreter. See POSNER, supra note 2, ch. 5 passim.
23. The most influential of the new, more sophisticated theories in literary criticism were developed
by Paul de Man in his Blindness and Insight (1983), Allegories of Reading (1979), The Resistance to
Theory (1986), and numerous accompanying articles. Deconstruction was itself "begun" by the French
philosopher Jacques Derrida, and perhaps its most representative texts are Derrida's collections Of
Grammatology (Gayatri C. Spivak trans., 1976) and Margins of Philosophy (Alan Bass trans., 1982).
Some legal and political aspects of this interpretive program are examined in DECONSTRUCTION AND
THE PossIBILrrY OF JUSTICE, supra note 21. For present purposes, the most illuminating essays in that
collection are those of Michel Rosenfeld, Fred Dallmayr, and Alan Wolfe.
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As with most of the specters, the danger posed by this "relativism" is
overstated, a subject we will return to in the final section of this paper.24
For now, notice a third commonality that bears directly on our central
question. Both formalists and intentionalists in literary criticism can find
good reason to reject the law/literature analogy: formalists because the
formal properties of law are not, allegedly, of the kind that bear on its
interpretation; and intentionalists because the law poses far-reaching
problems concerning the accurate reconstruction of the intentions held by
numerous people in the complex process of negotiation and argument that
creates legal documents. From this second point of view, the debates
concerning the intentions held by the Framers of the Constitution are
central. Even if we prize intention in literary evaluation, can we ever say
what those varied and disagreeing people intended, especially considering
the usual problems of distance in time and culture and the profound
difficulties in divining what vision of the future they held?
Since no single person could hold both these views, a more common
rejection of the law/literature analogy uses the intentionalist/formalist fork
as a fulcrum. This is the course defended by Posner, who declares himself
a formalist in matters literary and an intentionalist in matters le-
gal-incidentally adopting in each arena the more "conservative" of
available choices. I will explore his position in more detail in a moment.
We should notice first, though, that recent moves in the intentionalist/for-
malist debate have actually sought to collapse the distinction-and from
both sides. Fish no longer holds (if he ever did) a straightforward reader-
response view, and he has argued that we have no choice about taking
intentions into account when we read texts, for texts would make no sense
considered from any point of view other than one that regards them as
meaningful attempts to say something-in this sense we are all, like it or
not, intentionalists. 25  And the strict-intentionalist Hirsch, clarifying his
position, has recently said that we have no choice but to assess interpreta-
tions in terms of our own responses, and not against an always deeply
problematic attempt to reconstruct what the author intended.26
24. The main reason for this is that the worst consequences of the positions called "relativist" can
only be generated by a prior (and unnecessary) commitment to what Barbara Herrnstein Smith calls
"objectivist axiology": the strong view of objective truth sometimes associated with naive or common-
sense realism. Her version of the relativism specter is a mocking progression of dangers. See
BARBARA H. SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES FOR CRITICAL THEORY
(1988). Smith's account begins with charges of self-contradiction and fallacy, moves through "fatuous
forbearance" and "Panglossism and status-quoism," and ends with "the breakdown of law and morality"
and, therefore, "the Gulag, the Nazi death camps." Id. at 152-3. Her book's main point, shrewdly
argued, is that noting the presence of contingency or variability in judgment-including interpretive
judgment-does not lead to this gallery of horrors. It leads to better judgments.
25. Fish, Play of Surfaces, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 1, at 299.
26. Hirsch, supra note 20, at 56-7.
1994]
11
Kingwell: Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature?
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1994
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
These thinkers might see themselves as forcing the choice rather than
collapsing it, but such a view is inaccurate. Fish and Hirsch doubtless
disagree on many issues, but in these recent clarifications of their views
they both appear to agree that interpretation is something we do with texts,
and that intentions of the author are relevant in some sense to this
enterprise. Once we admit intentions, of course, the question is no longer
"formalist or intentionalist?" but instead "which intentions, and why?" The
notion of relevant intention thus acquires increasing importance, though
perhaps with no attendant increase in clarity. (Why relevant? To whose
ends? By what reckoning?) Nevertheless, this convergence suggests a more
convincing general account of interpretation than any of those mooted by
the confirmed intentionalists or formalists, an account that attempts to
define and incorporate notions of context, including the context of
intention. The precise boundaries of these contexts may prove difficult or
even impossible to place, of course, and such a theory may provide no
more than some rules of thumb. But it would bypass the limitations of the
posed forks.
This theory will be sketched in Section Im. A more immediate concern
is what such a theory can say about the analogy argument. Can we have
a theory that specifies relevant intentions for law and different ones for
literature? Or will the similarities that remain in such a theory be so
trivial-the shared words "text" and "interpretation," for example, but little
more-that the many differences will obviate it? To appreciate the depth
of these issues, and with the theoretical ground now cleared of false
choices, we must examine in more detail some influential versions of the
analogy argument as it arises in legal theory.
II. ANALOGIES AND DISANALOGIES
In his influential paper "How Law Is Like Literature," Ronald Dworkin
makes one of the broadest possible appeals to the pro-analogy argument in
the recent literature, an appeal that continues in his more systematic studies
of judicial interpretation in Law's Empire.27 The law, he says, is like a
chain novel: successive interpreters of the law are like the composers of a
novel whose discrete chapters are written, through time, by different
authors.2 This image captures a sense shared by many legal theorists that
the interpretation of law (which, unlike literary criticism, produces binding
results that can alter the relevant canon) is a shared authorial enterprise and
not a relationship of critics to (original) author. The novel is put in motion
27. RONALD DWORKIN, How Law is Like Literature, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985). This
paper is a re-working of Dworkin's Law as Interpretation, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 179 (1982). See also
RONALD DWORKIN, On Interpretation and Objectivity, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 167; RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
28. DWORKIN, How Law is Like Literature, supra note 27, at 158-62.
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by a first author, and the first chapter may determine many aspects of the
resulting novel by introducing characters or themes, but the first author has
little control over what exactly happens thereafter. Subsequent authors feel
themselves bound to honor the intentions of the previous author-but only
up to a point, the point at which they decide how the novel can best go
forward as a whole. New chapters have to be written in a manner that both
preserves continuity with what already exists and advances the story in a
positive way.29
On the basis of this analogy, Dworkin identifies two constraints that
operate on the efforts of subsequent authors in the chain novel and, by
extension, on the efforts of legal interpreters. First, there is a notion of
"fit," a constraint that preserves the coherence and consistency of the whole
text. Fit works, in other words, as an anticipation of completeness-a
sense, shared by all contributors, that the end product will be a complete
whole and not an incoherent patchwork of unconnected stories. But since
fit is not enough to guarantee that the text will be the best it can be,
Dworkin adds a second constraint called "best light" or, sometimes, "the
aesthetic hypothesis": the requirement that a given text be interpreted (and
added to) so that it is the best example possible of the "form or genre to
which it is taken to belong. 30
The aesthetic hypothesis and the importance of genre are clearly essential
in literary criticism. We do not ordinarily assess a novel by Proust in terms
of its ability to sustain nail-biting suspense to the last page, nor ask of a
Shakespearean sonnet that it contain a rousing patriotic message. To do so
would be to make an elementary genre mistake that would lead our
interpretations astray. I say "ordinarily" because in literary criti-
cism-unlike in law-we may indeed sometimes assess a work this way,
for the sheer interest of it, or for the possible new light it will throw on an
old and much-interpreted text. (We might also do it in jest or for satirical
purposes, thus using the gap between ordinary and extraordinary for other
purposes.) We may want to call genre-bending interpretations mistaken,
but in literary criticism the most we can typically say is that they fail to
take account of the whole text or, more damning, that they are uninterest-
ing.
Such counter-genre interpretations are, at any rate, not common. The
aesthetic hypothesis usually is in operation (sometimes even in counter-
genre interpretations, as that which is flouted). So in addition to asking
29. An important ambiguity arises, however, when we try to decide who the relevant authors are.
Lawyers arguing cases, judges deciding them, legal theorists writing and teaching them, and legislators
making new laws seem all to be possible candidates for authorhood in this sense. Dworkin focuses
attention on judges, but even here we might want to ask, for example, how judges at different levels
of the court system relate their interpretations to one another and to the influential schools of
interpretation. (I thank Todd Ducharme for this point.)
30. DWORKIN, How Law is Like Literature, supra note 27, at 149-54.
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whether a work is complete or coherent, we also want to know whether it
is a good representative of its kind. Indeed, according to Dworkin, this
necessary interplay between fit and best light constitutes, in effect, a third
constraint on the interpreter, namely, that the balance between them be
honored-a balance governed, in Dworkin's example, by Quine's claim
about a mutually adjusting "web of beliefs,' or, according to Georgia
Warnke, by something like reflective equilibrium.32 When the three
constraints are put into play in interpretation, they have the ability to render
a reading "constrained and valid, even if it cannot be considered uniquely
correct."
33
But does the aesthetic hypothesis guide us in legal interpretation?
Dworkin's claim is that it gives us something that other kinds of legal
theory do not, namely, what he calls "integrity." When we ask not only
whether an interpretation fits, but also whether it makes the law the best it
can be, we add a necessary dimension to adjudication: we make it accord
with basic moral principles that, in providing a fundamental normative
structure, hold the law up. Without that structure the law has no legitima-
cy; and without integrity in adjudication, the law has no access to principle
in its decisions. Law as integrity allows us to explain, then, why so-called
"checkerboard" decisions should be ruled out, for they fail to take account
of the moral status of persons and our conviction that status is important.
For example, a law that allows abortions for women born in even years, but
prevents it for those born in odd years, could be considered fair; it might
even, more doubtfully, be politically satisfying to some affected groups.
But it would lack integrity in Dworkin's sense because it would fail to join
the law to some shared moral principles that underlie the project of
community, namely, that rules concerning life and death should not be
arbitrary the way lotteries or rote selections are.34
Warnke, for one, finds Dworkin's interpretive commitment initially
encouraging. It suggests, she says, a new hermeneutic awareness among
theorists of law. Yet Dworkin, the thinker widely held responsible for "the
interpretive turn" in legal theory, lets the side down when it comes to
discussing actual cases. As Warnke demonstrates, his discussions of
McLoughlin v. O'Brian and Brown v. Board of Education indicate that
Dworkin's hermeneutic commitment is, in practice, quite small.35 In the
first case, Mrs. McLoughlin sued Mr. O'Brian for emotional injuries arising
from an automobile accident that injured her husband and four of her
31. W.V.O. QuINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEw 20 (2d rev.
ed. 1961). See also W.V.O. QUINE & JOSEPH ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELiFs (1978).
32. GEORGIA WARNKE, JUSTICE AND INTERPRETATION 70 (1993).
33. Id.
34. For further discussion of Dworkin's "integrity," see Denise Reaume, Is Integrity a Virtue?
Dworkin's Theory of Legal Obligation, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 380 (1989).
35. WARNKE, supra note 32, at 72-81.
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children, resulting in the death of one. Mrs. McLoughlin was informed of
the accident two hours after it happened, and her emotional shock began
when she visited the hospital and saw the condition of her family.36
Hercules, the super-judge of Dworkin's thought experiment (who has no
time constraints and ample intelligence), decides the case by choosing from
a ready-made list of interpretive options-i.e., competing thumbnail
statements of what we think people have a right to recover for injuries. We
choose one of these options, according to Dworkin, when we add
consideration of what public morality will bear. But, one might object,
selecting from this shopping list of choices is not interpretive adjudication,
which is necessarily unable to force choices into such neat categories. Law
as integrity might indeed demand reference to public morality, but that
would involve sensitive and contextual appreciation of conflicting demands.
A successful interpretation is one that resolves these conflicts in a plausible,
if not final, manner. We do not, in other words, successfully interpret
Moby-Dick-or anything else-by choosing from among a range of
competing (and reductive) options.
The appeal to public morality is also not firm in Dworkin's theory. In
Brown, the well-known segregation case argued under the Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause, Hercules cannot let public morality hold sway.
Why? Because the Constitution deals with matters of fundamental
importance, and public morality may be divided or confused on such an
issue. The decision therefore turns on an even more problematic appeal to
"basic political values," values which are presumed to be more apparent to
judges than to ordinary citizens. But what is the source of such values,
assuming they exist? Dworkin cannot retreat to an impoverished Framers'
intent position to secure them, so he must refer-rather hopefully, it seems
to me-to the glue of society and the importance of law's legitimacy. But
to make this move is to enter the realm of political theory.
Let me be clear: Dworkin's interpretations of these cases may be valid.
There is, however, nothing hermeneutic about deciding them in these ways,
and the chain-novel criteria of fit and best light seem no longer much in
evidence. Warnke concludes, correctly, that Dworkin has sacrificed the
most valuable aspect of an interpretive theory, namely its ability to educate
both the interpreter and his or her community, not merely to recapitulate
the existing community norms. Perhaps even more obviously, there is no
explicit attention to an analogy argument here. The aesthetic hypothesis,
when applied to law, is no longer aesthetic in any meaningful sense: the
sense of "best" we appeal to in making the law the "best it can be"
concerns standards of public morality or political value, and it is at least
36. The point of dispute in the case was the question of delay. The precedents, in which plaintiffs
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unclear how these standards are related to the kind of aesthetic criteria that
would govern a literary judgment. Since the point of asking the analogy
question is that law is not usefully thought of, even trivially, as just another
genre beside the romance or the epic, the pro-analogy position has not been
sufficiently defended by the thinker many consider its foremost propo-
nent.37
These drawbacks may not be the most obvious ones. For critics who
simply see too much making and not enough finding in Dworkin's theory,
the image of the chain novel is vastly overstated, and Dworkin's inter-
pretive constraints dangerously misleading. Consider: a chain novel has
what Jessica Lane calls "a thrust toward closure," something which the law,
by definition, lacks.38 There is also some measure of agreement in literary
criticism about the formal values associated with a given genre. Although
this agreement is often overstated by outsiders, it is clear that the prospects
of agreement on the formal values governing legal interpretation-the
values of public morality-are much worse. It is not even certain that there
exists genuine commensurability between text and reader in this kind of
interpretation (hence the interminable disputes about Framers' intent). In
short, Lane argues, Dworkin's version of the analogy argument must fail:
law and literature have different needs, impulses, associated practices, and
communities.
Perhaps the most important of these differences concerns the relative
power of literary and legal interpretations. Because of the social practices
and structures of the law, its interpretations are demonstrably binding in a
way barred to a literary critic. As Fiss says: "There can be many schools
of literary interpretation, but ... in legal interpretation there is only one
school and attendance is mandatory. All judges define themselves as
members of this school and must do so in order to exercise the prerogatives
of their office." More bluntly, "even if the rule of law fails to persuade,
it can coerce. '39 And this recourse to coercion, though it says nothing in
itself about the correctness of an interpretation, does ensure its binding
quality. Fish, emphasizing the presence of interpretive communities, argues
that there are appeals to finality and authority in literary interpretation,
too-and he is right. It is also the case that defenders of the disanalogy
37. Those who defend the broad continuity of text seem to me to underestimate this point; if law
were just another genre (that is, of literature in the broad sense), it would not pose its special kind of
interpretive difficulties. It is precisely because law comes wedded to social power, especially the
"legitimate" use of force, that stopping at an identification of generic difference is not enough. Such
a position leaves all the hard questions unasked.
38. Jessica Lane, The Poetics of Legal Interpretation, in INTERPRETiNG LAW AND LrrERATURE,
supra note 2, at 269-84. Lane gives an effective overview of Dworkin's recent work on legal interpre-
tation. She is especially convincing in her demonstration that the superior rationality of the Hercules
model (in Law's Empire) is inconsistent with the chain-novel analogy developed in How Law is Like
Literature, supra note 27.
39. Fiss, supra note 7, at 234-35.
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tend to overstate both the uniformity of consensus in law and the lack of
consensus in literary interpretation. Yet despite all this shading, there
remains a clear difference: in law, an interpretation can be backed by state
power-thus, if there is not a single right answer, there is at least a single
answer.
40
It is because those two things are distinct, however, that objections of the
kind that worry Fiss are able to get a foothold in legal theory. If an
interpretation could be binding but not correct, is the door not open to
"political realist" theories of law that would see it as the mere expression
of political power? Fiss himself drives a wedge between the binding
character of certain judicial decisions and their correctness. Plessy v.
Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education are both, in his view,
"objective" in that they were arrived at under the practice-sanctioned
constraints-or "disciplining rules"-of legal interpretation. Nevertheless,
only Brown is correct, and it, in effect, overturned Plessy. According to
Fiss, Plessy could be incorrect for a variety of interpretive, or internal,
reasons: the judges may have failed to understand the authoritative rules
correctly, or they may have misapplied them. But the decision may also
be incorrect, says Fiss, in terms of external reasons-that is, moral,
religious, or political reasons not strictly related to law. Yet Fiss never
satisfactorily clarifies the relation between these realms, or the issue of how
the second kind of reason can be built into the "objective" disciplining
rules of legal interpretation.
What does it mean, after all, both to follow a rule and to misapply it?
Or to follow it even while misunderstanding it? Fish's main objection to
the Fiss account is that this notion of disciplining rules, supposed by Fiss
to secure objectivity (and thereby ward off the specter of nihilism), is itself
incoherent, and that the language of objectivity is simply unhelpful. 41
Fish's notion of "doing what comes naturally," Wittgensteinian in
inspiration, is simply that there exist practices of various kinds, including
the one we call legal interpretation, and that these practices carry on
perfectly well (at some level) in terms of our various needs and interests.
An exhaustive set of rules for a practice is a logical impossibility, and any
set of formal rules-which would really be guidelines or rules of
thumb-can only ever be articulated by abstracting from a practice that
already works and with which we are already familiar: that is, a practice
about which we have a high degree of "tacit knowledge."
40. Of course, this characteristic may hold more in theory than in practice, where lower courts may
depart from the "single answer" as a result of incompetence or interpretive differences. While, again
in theory, such "errors" can be remedied through the appeals process, "corrections" often do not occur
because of limitations on the resources of the parties, restricted access to competent counsel, and so on.
(I thank Todd Ducharme for this point.)
41. Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325 (1984), reprinted in INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 251-67.
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Game analogies are popular in making this kind of point, in the manner
of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.42 The rules of chess are
not themselves the game of chess, and memorizing the rules will not make
me a good player-indeed, may not make me a player at all, unless I
understand as well some of the "unspoken" aims and guidelines of chess.
Or consider the game of baseball: as coaches, we might give a rookie
pitcher the excellent advice to "throw strikes. 43 As a rule to constrain his
conduct on the mound, however, this directive will prove worse than
useless. The simplest strike is a fastball through the zone, and the rookie
pitcher, following our rule, serves up a succession of heaters that get
rocked by quick-swinging hitters. Following the rule, he is nevertheless not
playing the game, or anyway not "really" playing it. The issue here is not
only that he has to know in advance what a strike is and how it fits into the
game; he must also know some of the subtle and deceptive ways to get
strikes-sometimes, for example, the only way to get a strike is to throw
the ball outside the strike zone. He must further understand crucial
exceptions and the situations that call for them: the pitch-out, the
intentional walk, the retaliatory beanball. The rule does not constrain
anything; it is useless as a rule-too general, uninformative, misleading.
Fish's argument, then, is valuable not as a statement in favor of political
interpretation, or as a manifesto of legal nihilism (or realism), but as a
reminder that specifying rules of interpretation is a mug's game. By calling
attention to the degree of practice-specific knowledge operative in
interpretation, he also manages to challenge the disanalogy Fiss was keen
to maintain. The difference between law and literature is not that there are
objective interpretations in one and not the other, or that there is an
available notion of correctness in one and not the other. Fish even
challenges the widespread notion that literary interpretation is not binding
or authoritative, and does so consistently by drawing attention to institu-
tional features of the practice that govern such interpretations: publication
record, personal reputation, and explicit hierarchies of universities, journals,
and presses. That there is one answer in law does not mean that it is the
right answer; and that there is no right answer in literary criticism does not
mean that there is no answer. In short, it is not nihilistic to claim that all
meanings are practice-based. The theoretical task is to show how that
meaning is generated, and which features among the many possible ones
are considered, by practitioners, to be relevant.
42. LUDWIG WrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953).
43. Bill Lee, the eccentric Boston Red Sox and Montreal Expos pitcher, reported in his memoirs
that he once had a dream in which Tom Landry, then coach of the Dallas Cowboys football team,
appeared and gave him just this imperative. My baseball example is clearly also derived from Fish's
basketball example, where the given rule is, "Take only good shots." Fish, Fish v. Fiss, in
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 254-55.
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This sort of claim is anathema to Posner's strict division of law and
literature and to his related worries about a creeping contagion of
skepticism in law. Indeed, it appears-in Fiss and Posner, anyway-that
the motivation to advance a disanalogy argument comes from the largest
specter of them all, the destruction of "objective" meaning. Hence Posner's
two-step theoretical commitment, to be what he calls a New Critic (or
formalist) in literature and what he calls an intentionalist (which may in
fact imply a kind of originalism) in law. The division is predicated on a
sense that the criteria of meaning or success diverge in literature and law,
and Posner is distinguished as one of the few thinkers who devotes explicit
attention to the question of analogy. Literature, he says, is governed by
values of aesthetic pleasure, while law is governed by values of truth. A
legal text is like a message, something that in principle we can ask to have
repeated. Like a command or a communication, it is not suggestive, ironic,
ambiguous, multifaceted, or multilevelled-all things we might want, or
even demand, of a literary text. It has a single meaning, and we can only
discern that meaning by attending to the intentions of its authors. Legal
interpretation is akin to asking of an indistinct or distant interlocutor, "How
do you mean?" Hence Posner's reductionist position: "At the level of
message most works of literature are clear," he says, inaccurately; "What
makes them unclear is that we are not interested in staying at that level.
But the message level is the only interesting level of a statutory or
constitutional text. That is why the Peller-Tushnet interpretation of the age-
35 provision in the Constitution seems obtuse rather than ingenious."
44
This view has an attractive common-sense feel, but it is misleading. As
mentioned before, the difference between straightforward and ambiguous
texts lies not in features of the texts themselves, but in features of the
contexts in which the texts are advanced and understood. The crucial
difference between law and literature may lie precisely in this: not that their
relevant central texts are metaphysically different, but that their contextual
practices are constrained in different ways. It is precisely because we
desire stability and finality in legal interpretation that we insist on single
answers to questions of interpretation; by the same token, desiring novelty
and innovation in literary criticism, we prize new and plural answers to the
question of what a given text means. Feeling the stability of legal
interpretation threatened, a Posnerian might balk at the very presence of
interpretive theory in the realm of law. These interventions from literary
theory seem to represent, after all, a challenge to the law's status as
binding. That status resides, however, not in the texts of law, but in the
practices of using those texts, and no general theory of interpretation has
44. POSNER, supra note 2, at 242.
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the power to call that entire practice into question.45 Yet this, after all, is
what worries Posner and Fiss about the rise of deconstruction in literary
theory and the related-if it is related-rise of critical legal studies in law.
The danger is overstated. Such "academic" disputes do not overturn
practices by themselves. Deconstruction no more undermined the simple
act of reading a book on the beach than CLS has undermined the myriad
acts of judges and lawyers.
Still, there is a challenge here, and to be too sanguine about the
ineffectiveness of theory is to collapse into Fish-like reductionism. Legal
theorists worry about the challenge of skeptical theories of interpretation
because it matters a good deal whether their practice is stable and in good
working order. Nobody's life would be lost if the practice of literary
criticism were suddenly to collapse; but a collapse of the system of legal
interpretation, especially that of constitutional interpretation, could easily
wreak social havoc. Defection from the republic of letters does not
compare in seriousness with possible defections from the Republic if the
law were shown to lack legitimacy. So it is crucial that a theory of legal
interpretation take account of these practice-specific demands of law: its
needs for a final adjudicator, a final answer, stability and commonality, and
so on. Literary interpretation has different needs, and theory must be
equally sensitive to them. It follows that if practices diverge, their products
do as well. What is denied here is a third claim-a claim usually assumed,
but not defended, by writers on these issues-that divergent practice and
divergent product are equal to divergent texts. If true, that claim might
indeed defeat the prospect of a general theory of interpretation. But it is
not true.
To get a clearer sense of this, consider the following tables of elements.
The first expresses some relevant features of the practices of legal and
literary interpretation, while the second expresses some features of typical
interpretations offered within those practices. In the practice table, the
terms are divergent answers to the same implied questions; the second table
is merely an attempt to articulate some relevant features of each kind of
interpretation.
45. For a clear statement of the position that textual status is always conferred by contextual
features of reading, see Walter B. Michaels, Against Formalism: Chickens and Rocks, in INTERPRETING
LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 215-27.
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Notice that most of these features appear to support a disanalogy
position. How could two such different practices, with such different end
products, be relevantly linked? "At a sufficiently high level of abstraction,"
says Posner, articulating a view shared by many, "the interpretive tasks in
the two fields may seem to merge. But as soon as we get down to cases
the commonality of the legal and the literary inquiries disintegrates."
6
Apart from an implicit disregard of abstraction, a lawyer's forgivable
preoccupation with cases, the failure of this statement is that the general
theory of interpretation employed by Posner is too unsophisticated to give
the commonality between law and literature its due. I suggested at the
beginning that law would prove to be utterly unlike literature, and yet
utterly like it. Here we see the first part of that apparently paradoxical
position.
This observation is, however, only part of the story. By taking as his
targets overstated pro-analogy arguments, like Sanford Levinson's crude
statement about the multiplicity of Constitutions being comparable to the
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multiplicity of Hamlets, Posner does the debate a disservice.47 We are
forced to an extreme where we must choose between saying that reading
law is either just like reading literature or nothing like reading literature.
Operating with an implicit but undefended standard of "aesthetic judg-
ment"-a standard even less nuanced than Dworkin's pro-analogy
version-Posner naturally rules law out of interpretive court. So committed
before the fact to the disanalogy, it is impossible for him to canvass a
theory of interpretation that would usefully include both legal and literary
texts. I will now attempt to bolster the analogy argument with a more
sympathetic version of such a theory.
III. TALKING TEXTS
A general interpretive theory allows us to assess, precisely and explicitly,
the limits of the analogy between law and literature. Such a theory is best
understood as a descriptive account of the presuppositions of
interpretation-not rules in the prescriptive sense, impossible for reasons
already mentioned, but a reconstruction of what goes on when one attempts
to say what a text means.48  In the realm of law, this hermeneutic
emphasis on practice-based presuppositions has the effect of moving us
beyond what Alan Wolfe has called, in a felicitous phrase, "algorithmic
justice.,,49 But whether the raising of a practice to theoretical clarity has
any normative significance, and thus recovers a prescription after all, is
another question. I will address it in the final section of this paper.
The model of interpretation I favor is Gadamerian in origin. Its most
obvious and immediate benefit is an ability to overcome some of the
47. See Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 378 (1981), reprinted in
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 166. Levinson's disservice to the debate is to
take interesting notions--e.g., Rorty's distinction between strong and weak textualists, and the literary
theoretical claims about textual indetenninacy--and to make them into a dogmatic position. So, for
example, his argument that there is no uncontroversial set of public values does not entail (as he
suggests) that there are no public values at all. Likewise, "no determinate textual meaning" is not
equivalent to "no meaning at all." Gerald Graff's reply to Levinson makes the obvious point that at
the level of practice the problem of meaning is no problem at all: our practical ability to do things with
words is unimpaired by a failure to meet impossibly high standards of determinate meaning. Gerald
Graff, "Keep off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies, in id., at 175-80. 1 will have
more to say on this point below, but for a helpful discussion of these issues, see Christopher L. Kutz,
Note, Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997 (1994).
48. Gadamer's magnum opus, Truth and Method, is the basic text of this view. HANS GEORG
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Garrett Barden and John Cumming trans., 1975). For a detailed
treatment of its relevance to legal interpretation, including further citations, see David Couzens Hoy's
excellent overview, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 135 (1985), reprinted in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 319-38. See
also Gerald L. Bruns, Law and Language: A Hermeneutics of the Legal Text, in LEGAL HERMENEUrICS,
supra note 1; David C. Hoy, Intentions and the Law: Defending Hermeneutics, in id.
49. Alan Wolfe, Algorithmic Justice, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE, supra
note 21, at 361-86. But it is not enough, pace some critics (notably Terry Eagleton), to overturn law's
status by drawing attention to an imagined desire for algorithm. Posner makes this point especially
well, and uses it to bolster his objectivist position. What neither side of the choice makes clear is that,
as I argue in here, we can still have validity without method.
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traditional disputes associated with the forks discussed in Section I. The
conversational features of Gadamer's model-the associated notions of
horizon, horizon-fusion, and the third language-are the keys here. Instead
of accepting the choice of emphasizing one side or the other of the
interpretive process, this model attempts to bring both into play, and thus
transcends the extremism of the debate between New Critics and reader-
response theorists. It also offers a more sophisticated account of the
interpretive weight owing to authorial intent: it suggests that the text-in-
context must be considered as itself the object of interpretation-an act
with its own contextual limitations.50 Finally, it makes room for reason
and truth in interpretation without endorsing a strict or absolutist conception
of transcendental justification.
The process of interpretation is represented here as the contact between
two spheres or horizons-mine as interpreter, and the text's (or text-
analogue's) as something separated from me in time or cultural distance.
Interpretation involves, then, an attempt to "fuse" these two horizons by
rendering the claims or import of the text into terms we can understand.
But this model of horizon-fusion is indeed only a representation, a fact
which is often forgotten. In interpretation, we do not perform the
impossible feat of leaping beyond our own horizon; instead, we find the
text within it as something that needs to be understood-a sort of lump of
foreign matter, or "xenocyst"-and so extend our horizon's boundaries in
the act of understanding.5' Understanding involves finding a place for this
alien lump in our already existing sphere of meaning. Coming to
understand an alien or distant text is not a static process. It calls for
transformative effort, and so the reader-in-context does not remain
unchanged by an encounter with the text-in-context. Gadamer's suggestion
is that interpretation, like true translation, creates a third language, and this
notion captures the ability of the interpretive process to alter both reader
and read. The conversational nature of the process is demonstrated in
interpretation's imperatives to honor what Dworkin called "fit"-the
anticipation of completeness. A valid interpretation is one in which we, as
sensitive interpreters, attempt to take account of as many elements of the
text as possible. We do so by, among other things, playing parts off
against the whole, matching elements of the reading to other elements in
a way that strives for some kind of unity.
50. Hoy, Intentions and the Law, supra note 48, at 179-82. Gadamer does not, however, believe
that intention is recoverable as something completely outside the text. The emphasis on context-which
is discerned by looking at other texts-means that we are never, in the strict sense, outside the text.
But that does not mean that the significance of communication, the intention to say something through
words, is lost.
51. This point is surprisingly often mislaid, even by discerning commentators. See, e.g., Fish's
chiding comments for Fred Dallmayr and E.D. Hirsch in Play of Surfaces, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS,
supra note 1, at 305.
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But is this all that constitutes validity in interpretation? Gadamer
emphasizes, in well-known passages of his work, the role that prejudices
or "fore-judgments" play in interpretation and understanding. Indeed, the
conversation between us and the text is impossible without them.
According to Gadamer, we "talk to" the text in the sense of implicitly
asking for support of a given reading, a reading that puts our fore-
judgments into play-meaning that we implicitly offer them up for critical
assessment. The text "talks back" to us in the sense of providing internal
evidence that a proposed reading is, in both senses, too partial-too limited,
not complete enough, and/or too overdetermined by our prejudices. But no
act of interpretation can get off the ground without the presence of fore-
judgments, for they provide the background of assumptions and presump-
tions of meaningfulness that make understanding possible. We could not
even begin talking to the text, nor take any of its evidence as replies to our
interpretive enquiries, unless the fore-judgments defining our horizon of
concern were present. Hence Gadamer's celebrated dismantling of the
Enlightenment "prejudice against prejudice," and hence, too, his adoption
of Heidegger's notion of the hermeneutic circle.52 Putting our prejudices
into explicit contact with the text does not necessarily mean
overdetermining the text, because this contact is itself transformative. We
can only begin to understand on the basis of what we now believe; but
coming to understand inevitably alters what we believe, and this in turn
will affect our acts of understanding themselves. The value of the process
is expressed in the Heideggerian slogan, equally applicable to Gadamer,
that the important thing is not to get out of the hermeneutic circle, but to
get into it in the right way.
A third element, or feature, of Gadamer's descriptive account of
interpretation is the central role played by Wirkungsgeschichte, or the
history of effects, accumulated through time around a text. This history,
sometimes misleadingly called tradition, is crucial both in an obvious sense
(previous interpretations of a given text are relevant to our own attempts
at understanding), but also in the sense that Wirkungsgeschichte is another
way of expressing the context that determines our horizons of concern
when approaching the text. It includes prejudices we might think of as
specific to us, but which are, in fact, legacies of a long history of
communal interaction and agreement. (This characteristic is one obvious
sense in which we are determined by where we happen to stand.) It also
includes interpretive legacies-theoretical or disciplinary commitments,
52. Heidegger's discussion of the hermeneutic circle is at sections 31-33 of MARTIN HEIDEGGER,
BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson trans., 1962). The hermeneutic circle-where
pre-understanding is confirmed and/or modified by acts of understanding, and so necessary for
beginning the task of understanding-received earlier discussion in nineteenth-century classics of
hermeneutic theory, notably in the work of Schleiermacher.
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practice- or community-specific norms and interests-which will guide our
acts of understanding and prevent them from "going off the rails." In this
sense, the precise limits and contours of the reader-in-context are set by a
history, or tradition, in which we find ourselves. Likewise for the text-in-
context, which is determined both by a history of interpretive efforts and
by the kinds of things we are able to hear the text saying. I said that the
Gadamerian picture overturned the intentionalist/formalist debate because
it took account of authorial intention without sacrificing the authority of the
text as object. No text is separable from its context-but the precise limits
of that context, the line separating relevant intention from irrelevant, cannot
be placed in advance, theoretically. The limits only become obvious within
the process of interpretation itself, and are there affected in large measure
by the kinds of things we, as readers, are already prepared to see as
meaningful.
What, then, is the right way to get into the hermeneutic circle? It may
be disappointing to find that there is no precise-no methodological-an-
swer to this question. Gadamer mentions the need to cultivate sensitivity
to the text, to approach it with "the right touch," to abandon the impera-
tives of method and cultivate the imperatives of understanding and truth.
Yet this sensitivity is something one can only judge by entering, and
becoming adept at, the practice of interpretation itself. There are no rules
to guide us here; or, if there are rules, they are like the rules of a game that
is much more complex than, and inexplicable solely in reference to, its
rules. This inability to play the game except by entering the game, together
with Gadamer's emphasis on Wirkungsgeschichte, have led some critics to
view his interpretive model as excessively conservative. In a variation of
the same charge, it has also been suggested that the theory is relativistic:
it allows too many interpretive flowers to bloom, providing no definite
standard of judgment. Because the circle described by Gadamer allows for
no "transcendent" assessment of text or prejudice, this account of
interpretation may indeed appear to leave everything as it is. The debate
between Gadamer and Jiirgen Habermas turns on this central concern, that
Gadamer's model does not provide any room for genuine critique and is
therefore conservative in orientation. 53 Without critique, the charge goes,
we are caught in an endlessly spinning round of interpretation that finds
53. Habermas's specific objections begin with his review of Truth and Method in JORGEN
HABERMAS, ZUR LOGIC DER SOZIALWISSENSCHAFrEN 251-90 (1970), where he suggests that Gadamer's
interpretive model is devoid of critical possibilities because it leaves no room for assessing deception
and force. A good English translation of Habermas's review, prepared by Fred Dallmayr and Thomas
McCarthy, is found in HERMENEUTICS AND MODERN PHILOsoPHY 243 (Brice Wachterhauser ed., 1986),
together with Gadamer's reply, On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection. Habermas
replied with several subsequent essays, the best of which is On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality,
in THE HERMENEUTICS READER, supra note 1, at 294-319, a fusion of two early papers published in
Inquiry. This collection also includes excerpts from Truth and Method. See id. at 257-74. Hoy
provides a good overview of this debate. See Hoy, Interpreting the Law, supra note 48, at 319-38.
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only what it sets out to find, a quickly turning rotor that fails to engage a
critical engine.
There are two options here. We may, as Gadamer has done in work
subsequent to Truth and Method (especially in replies to Habermas),
emphasize the possibilities of "immanent critique" in this model. Because
understanding is a transformative process, from which we never emerge
unchanged, the very act of interpretation is itself critical: in the search for
a shared language of understanding, it alters both text and reader.
Immanent critique assesses acts of interpretation by playing them off
against provisionally fixed elements of our horizon. We continue the
critical process by assessing new aspects of our horizon against other
elements, now themselves taken to be provisionally fixed. In this way we
are able to be critical without performing the allegedly impossible feat of
getting out of our horizon of concernm-an act akin to jumping over our
own shadows.
But that may seem insufficient. We may instead begin looking for a
transcendent pivot by means of which genuinely critical assessments can
be put into play. Habermas's work can be fairly described as an elaborate
and detailed attempt to find a transcendent fulcrum that is not plagued by
the difficulties made obvious in critiques of earlier attempts, especially
those associated with thinkers in the Cartesian-Kantian tradition.' His
answer is, like theirs, a characterization of what it means to be rational;
unlike theirs, it is reconstructed from basic competencies, especially those
of communication, and therefore avoids the problems of ideality and
formalism associated with, for example, the Kantian account. According
to Habermas, this reconstruction demonstrates that rational beings share a
"transcendental-pragmatic" anticipation of agreement in communication.
That is, when we make a claim, we are implicitly asking for (and
expecting) all rational persons to agree with it. This implication, obvious
for Habermas in normative as well as descriptive claims, points toward a
shared commitment to what is sometimes called the "unforced force" of the
better argument. The presuppositions of communication-that we all are
making arguments and are committed to being moved by superior
ones-are modeled by Habermas in the "ideal speech situation." Though
our actual communication often fails to be rational, in that it does not result
in agreement, Habermas's claim is that the very act of communication
commits us to the rational possibility that all disputes could be resolved by
common reference to a superior argument. This possibility then acts as a
54. Habermas's extensive work on this project began systematically with the two-volume work, The
Theory of Communicative Action (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984-88) and continued, emphasizing its
role in moral theory, with the essays in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Christian
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"regulative ideal" that can guide and assess the rationality of our actual
debates and the legitimacy of the norms secured in those debates.
What do Habermas's criticisms tell us about the Gadamerian model's
relevance to legal interpretation and the analogy question?" Is immanent
critique enough to deal with a conflict of interpretations? If not, is the
model of any use for legal interpretation, where conflict must be resolved?
In other words, even though we might be inclined to agree that the general
account is a useful description of interpretive acts tout court, disanalogy
will ultimately outweigh analogy if this account fails to provide a
decisionmaking procedure when competing and incompatible interpretations
arise. The differences between Gadamer and Habermas are what move
David Hoy to call the former an interpretivist and the latter a noninter-
pretivist, and make Warnke seek release from interpretive conflict in a
Habermasian "rational" pivot.5 6 Since legal interpretation cannot tolerate
a plurality of interpretive options in the way literary criticism can,
Habermas's criticisms and reforms may show the Gadamerian general
theory to be just what Posner and Fiss suspected-a true but trivial account,
emphasizing similarity on a highly abstract level, but one that breaks down
similarity when it comes to cases. How fair is this point?
Conflict among interpretations has always been a source of worry for
legal theorists because it seems to threaten the possibility of a unique result,
a strong practice-based desideratum. The real problem, however, is that
conflict threatens the justifiability of any actually generated unique result.
We can easily imagine, and use, mechanisms that achieve unique results
but that nevertheless fail to justify their answers as uniquely right. So it
is not simply that law cannot tolerate plurality in result; it cannot tolerate
plurality in interpretation either, if that plurality casts aspersions on the
legitimacy of results, however unique and enforceable they are. Hence, the
conflict that concerns us here is not so much conflict concerning rival
judicial decisions, since that kind of conflict is in practice ruled out by,
among other things, a determinate (if imperfect) decisionmaking procedure
that includes the hierarchy of courts. The conflict at issue really boils
down to differing (descriptive) views of what judges are doing when they
decide cases, and therefore what status those decisions have. Confusion
enters when these descriptive conflicts are run together with normative
55. Paul Ricoeur's interpretive theory, which goes beyond the Gadamer-Habermas debate by, in
effect, appropriating elements of each in a highly original way, may represent a superior position to
either. For Ricoeur's defense of "critical hermeneutics," see, for example, Interpretation Theory (1976)
and The Conflict of Interpretations (1974). Ricoeur attempts to reintegrate "method" with "truth" and
thus build a critical pivot for interpretation in the form of what he calls "the dialectic of suspicion and
recovery." For a short and accessible statement of this program, see Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and
the Critique of Ideology, in HERMENEurICS AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 53, at 300-39.
56. Hoy, Interpreting the Law, supra note 48, at 323; WARNKE, Habermas and the Conflict of
Interpretations, in JUSTICE AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 32, at 87.
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theories concerning what the law should be, and what judges should be
doing.
Dworkin's recent work provides an example of this. The background
struggle in Law's Empire is between a form of legal positivism, character-
ized (or recast) as the interpretive theory of conventionalism, and
Dworkin's own constructivist theory, law as integrity. Though his
presentation of the positivist case may indeed be weak and skewed, as
some commentators have suggested, this conflict illustrates an important
distinction. 57 Dworkin argues that when judges disagree about law, the
issue is not always one where shared rules have been differently applied to
the same matter, or where shared tests have (or have not) been met in
particular cases; the issue may concern what law is. The disagreement may
be, in other words, theoretical rather than empirical. The positivist claim
that all judicial arguments are empirical in nature attempts simply to
articulate the facts of law or previous decisions of legislatures and courts,
and fails to account for such nonfactual controversy concerning law. The
possibility of nonfactual controversy-the idea that judges may disagree not
over facts but over philosophical commitment-undermines traditional
theories of law based on the idea that law could be described semantically
in terms of its truth conditions. It also provides the first point in favor of
law as integrity, which allows for a plurality of interpretations as long as
they are governed by the criteria, or constraints, discussed earlier.58
Yet, even if we accept Dworkin's motivation for the interpretive turn,
even if we were to accept his view that interpretation is "constructive"
rather than "conversational" (this choice is a false one-genuine interpreta-
tion is both),59 we must still be disconcerted by the thought that disagree-
ment remains a possibility. There is no reason to expect that two
interpreters, each approaching the same material and each employing the
constraints of law as integrity (or indeed of some other sensitive model),
will always arrive at the same answer. And if they do not, how do we
decide between the rival answers? It was at just this point, noticing that
Gadamer's interpretive model could validate rival and incompatible
interpretations, that Habermas was moved (as Richard Rorty has put it) to
"go transcendental and offer principles." 6 It is only because Habermas
57. See, e.g., Brenda Baker's critique of Law's Empire, Empire-Building, 32 DIALOGUE 149-62
(1993).
58. I follow Baker's discussion here.
59. Notice that Dworkin's shying away from "conversational" models of interpretation is motivated
by a desire to avoid debates concerning the intentions of temporally distant authors. His "constructive"
model of interpretation concentrates on where I find myself, and on whether I can construct an
interpretive stance I feel comfortable ascribing to myself. But since intention need not be the problem
Dworkin apparently thinks it is, and cannot in practice be excised from a valid interpretation, there is
no need to make this choice.
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claims to find those principles in the structures of communication
themselves that he is saved from the accusation of merely descending into
positivism.
But it is also possible that Habermas makes his move too soon.
Interpretations are never, after all, offered in an assessment vacuum, and we
are rarely, if ever, faced with a choice between two (or more) interpreta-
tions that seem just as good as each other. (This was Warnke's point in
challenging Dworkin's version of McLoughlin v. O'Brian.) Even in literary
criticism, where plurality is arguably more desirable, there are strong
personal and institutional pressures to find an interpretive "band" in which
the acceptably interesting is separated from the unacceptably uninteresting.
This part of the interpretive process is not governed only by factors
peculiar to the act of interpretation itself, but rather by practice-based
constraints that have to do, as always, with knowing how to play the game.
The mistake often made in thinking about rival interpretations is to forget
their embeddedness in such practices, which over time have developed
ways not only of guiding interpretation but of deciding between different
interpretations. In short, we give up on Gadamer's model too easily.
Being in constructive conversation with the text is not something we do in
isolation; it is something we do as members of a given community, whose
shared goals and limitations govern our acts of interpretation as much as
any goals or limitations we consider individual to ourselves.
Perhaps we give up on Dworkin's model too quickly as well: when we
try to make the law the best it can be, we can only do so with reference to
the moral and political values we think important to the community
governed by the law. Since our sense of those values is an element of our
interpretations, that sense too is available for assessment when members of
the community try to decide whether our interpretations are any good.
Awareness of contextual and institutional features of interpretation does not
entail the absence of reason in our assessments. Any choice-as posed, for
example, by both left-wing political realists like Roberto Unger and some
extreme objectivists-between a miraculous harmony of reason and law and
a cacophony of competing power claims is a false fork. We need not
accept this account of the choices, or of the demand to choose.6' The
truth of an interpretation concerns both its "plain message" and its
embeddedness within practices and institutions with determinate features
61. Hoy makes this point especially well in Interpreting the Law, supra note 48, at 324. For an
accessible treatment of Roberto Unger's views, especially his political realism about the law, see his
The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1983). Views like Unger's, which argue that law is little more
than a set of institutional power plays, find themselves sharing diagnostic (though not, of course,
prescriptive) commitments with some right-wing political realists in the strong objectivist school. See
also CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan Hutchinson ed., 1989).
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(including ones of political and personal interest), for neither makes sense
alone, and we cannot recover one without the other.62
Of course, this practice-based view of interpretation does not provide us
with any definitive way to validate a given interpretation as objective or
true, if those adjectives are taken to extend beyond the practice in question.
Within the practice, however, many theoretical debates will concern
precisely this question; the legacy of scholarship on law and literature is
evidence of that fact. We have a practice called legal interpretation. What
does it mean, and what status do its products enjoy? These questions
exercise us because we want the practice to have a theoretical or rational
sanction-we want it to be a legitimate practice, and not simply one with
enormous but unjustified decisionmaking power. Yet, because there is
another practice called scholarly debate, with its own set of ends and
purposes (continuation high among them), there can be no final answer to
these questions. As we will see in the next section, even those who claim
not to be offering an answer cannot escape the round of statement and
reply that marks the theoretical practice of philosophical debate.
It may be that the strongest benefit of seeing the limitations of any
general interpretive account is a highlighting of the limitations of theory in
general. There are those, like David Hoy and, arguably, Gadamer himself,
who want to save the account from false assessment. It provides "heuristic
recommendations," in Hoy's phrase, but not rules.63 Since it was never
intended to be systematic, rule-governed, precise, or normative, they argue,
the account cannot satisfy demands that associate those features with a
valid theory, as either necessary or sufficient conditions. Thus, it may
succeed as an account, if not as a theory, once we surrender certain
unrealistic aspirations presumably inherited from philosophy. But if the
account is not a theory in this sense, how are we to explain (a) why it
nevertheless seems to make cognitive claims, apparently redeemable via
evidence or reflection, that interpretation has a certain and definite
character; and (b) why it has an associated normative weight such that a
reading that fails to exhibit such a character is in some sense invalid or
incomplete?
These issues take us back to where we started, namely to the related
questions of validity and status in interpretation. These questions were
62. To make this claim is, in some sense, to recapitulate Ricoeur's dialectic between suspicion and
recovery: we note the pressures and limitations of institutions not to shut down further discernment of
meaning, but precisely to make it possible. (I thank Matthew Parfitt for this point.)
63. Hoy, Interpreting the Law, supra note 48, at 325. Compare this view with Brice Wacher-
thauser's notion that hermeneutics provides the following "rules of thumb" concerning valid
interpretation: comprehensiveness, semantic depth, inclusivity, and teleological structure (i.e.,
anticipation of completeness). Brice Wacherthauser, Must We Be What We Say? Gadamer on Truth
in the Human Sciences, in HERMENEUTICS AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 53, at 219-41.
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raised by asking the analogy question explicitly. Can they also be solved
by answering it equally explicitly?
IV. THEORY V. THERAPY
In an essay called "Rhetorical Hermeneutics," Steven Mailloux tells an
affecting story of conflicting interpretations in a classroom situation.
Noting the absurdity of a Defense Department interpretation of the 1958
Space Act ("We interpret the right to use space for peaceful purposes to
include military uses of space to promote peace in the world"), he is
dumbfounded to find a student disagreeing. As their conflict escalates, he
finds to his chagrin that he possesses no knock-down way of defeating
what he regards as a false interpretation. "It was at this point," he says,
"that I felt the 'theoretical urge': the overwhelming desire for a hermeneu-
tic account to which I could appeal to prove my student wrong. What I
wanted was a general theory of interpretation that could supply rules
outlawing my student's misreading."'  It is probably obvious from the
title of his essay that Mailloux thinks the theoretical urge is one that cannot
be satisfied. His scheme for "rhetorical hermeneutics" is a non-founda-
tional pragmatist account that emphasizes persuasive ability within a given
institutional setting or context.
By acknowledging his desire, Mailloux is, in common with other thinkers
of recent vintage, in the business of trying to cure us of it. We must
surrender the wish for a knock-down theory of interpretation, he suggests,
complete with explicit rules, that stops disagreement with finality. But the
posed choice between theory and therapy represents only the latest of forks
in contemporary interpretation theory. The attendant specters are easy to
characterize. If we choose theory, we will skew our practices (and our
understanding of those practices) as we worship before a false god; we will
be blind to the rhetorical, institutional, and political elements of inter-
pretation, and so fail to see the most important influences on what we are
doing. If we choose therapy, on the other hand, we will surrender any
claim to interpretations that can be called valid, true, correct, or objective;
we will never overcome disagreement, and we will descend into a
bottomless squabble of institutional forces. If we are very worried, we
could go further and raise the specters of nihilism and relativism, perhaps
not bothering to define them, and just suggest that anarchy will be loosed
upon the world. Everything will be as good as everything else, and so
(what does not actually follow) nothing will mean anything anymore.
64. Steven Mailloux, Rhetorical Hermeneutics, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra
note 2, at 345. Another version of the "therapeutic" position is given by Steven Knapp and Walter
Benn Michaels in their response to Hoy's hermeneutical position. Intention, Identity, and the
Constitution, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 1, at 187-99.
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As before, the choices-and the consequences-are rarely so stark. The
theory of interpretation discussed in Section III does not, apparently, have
the knock-down status associated with the "theoretical urge." It has,
moreover, no strict rules that attempt to guarantee validity and rule out
misreading. On the contrary, it is a theory that emphasizes precisely the
institutional, contextual, and historical elements of interpretation, while
insisting at the same time on the importance of the intentions and context
of the work interpreted. It is a theory not in its generation of precise rules,
but in its attempt to say what goes on in the practices of interpretation.
Even Fiss, when he defends "disciplining rules" or "professional grammar"
in interpretation, does not attempt to articulate them in detail. That is a
matter for the practice itself. (To that extent, there is no conflict between
Fiss and Fish: Fish does not deny that you can have rules of basketball; he
just denies that you can have them, complete and before the fact, to define
the practice.) And from the other side, Fish's emphasis on institutional
elements in interpretation-the fact of interpretive communities-is
distinctly not intended to make interpretation a bottomless pit of disagree-
ment: some interpretations will be ruled out as uninteresting or simply not
sufficiently accomplished.
Both theorist and therapist, in other words, are attempting to say what
goes on in interpretation. Both are making claims about the status of
certain interpretive practices. If one were inclined to be reductive, one
could say that the therapist is just another theorist: he or she intends claims
about interpretation, including the claim that we cannot have a theory of
interpretation, to be cognitive. If they can be redeemed at all-that is, if
the therapist can be right or wrong, accurate or inaccurate-then therapy is
indeed theory in some basic sense.65 Or, like Barbara Hermstein Smith,
one could distinguish theory from the narrower desires of "axiology": the
precise rules and discussion-ending fixed points of human rationality that
were, and are, supposed to be the only reliable guides of judgment.66 The
real conflict here, it seems, is a disagreement about what the law is, and
whether legal theory has any bearing on the law. Therapists incline to the
view that the law is "a surface play of forces," a social practice that has no
grounding in metaphysical truth or objective essences. Theorists allegedly
cling to the view that the law is in the business of securing objectively true
65. Hoy makes this point, that even therapists are theorists-though in some weaker sense than that
for which they attack others. Hoy, Intentions and the Law, supra note 48, at 173.
66. SMrrH, supra note 24. Smith's claim is that certain Enlightenment tendencies, in particular
those associated with Hume's "natural standard of taste" and Kant's "pure judgment," have twisted
subsequent philosophical reflection concerning judgment, leading to, among other things, a debilitating
fact/value distinction. Another version of the middle position in the current fork is STANLEY ROSEN,
HERMENEUTICS AS POLITICS (1987), which criticizes Derridean deconstruction by emphasizing the
inevitable political and institutional features of interpretation.
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answers to questions of contract, liability, rights, and the like, answers
which bind a society together in a strong way.
The choice is a false one because the positions are not so different from
each other. But it is also false because it is possible for people to hold
both positions, though perhaps not at exactly the same time. What posing
the choice misses is the irony, in Rorty's sense, that we might be capable
of exercising in this realm.67 It also misses the ability to distinguish
(again following Rorty) causal explanation of a practice from justification
of it. As lawyers or judges, we will certainly argue for an interpretation's
truth and will regard the decision reached by an appeal court as binding,
even if we think it wrong. At the level of practice, in other words, we can
all behave as realists about the law-just as, at the level of practice, we
want our surgeons to treat us merely as bodies. In addition, at the level of
a practice-specific theory-a theory called legal interpretation-we will
attempt to say as clearly as possible what goes on in the acts of interpreta-
tion themselves. Only at the level of philosophy, the level of non-specific
and justificatory theorizing, will we attempt to say what is "really" going
on in interpretation.
It is this last level that creates the problems, for here it is possible to
entertain alternative claims about status, including pragmatic or skeptical
ones that appear to undermine the authority of the law. Posner, responding
to Fish, says that "skepticism is an interesting and perhaps irrefutable
philosophical stance, but, when pushed as far as Fish pushes it, one
incapable of guiding action or interpretation., 68  Even if this is so,
Posner's criticism misses the point. Fish's skepticism is not about guiding
action or interpretation, and he is not worried (as Posner seems to think he
should be) about "reconciling" his skepticism with the existing consensus
in some interpretive communities. His skepticism concerns the justification
of such consensus, not the fact of it, which he does not-and can-
not--deny. Posner, by contrast, seems to think, like Fiss, that demon-
strating the fact of legal consensus is tantamount to justifying it philo-
sophically. Fish may be wrong about his skepticism, but here he is
thinking more clearly than the lawyers.
When philosophizing, we have traditionally tried to join our accounts
onto something called "the nature of reality" or "the world" or "the truth."
When theorizing in the specific sense, we merely try to say as clearly as
67. Rorty's "irony" is the ability to be of two minds about a practice and its theoretical description.
RORTY, The Contingency of Language, in CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 3 (1989); see also
Private Irony and Liberal Hope, in id. at 73. One version of this crucial distinction is thus that a
pragmatist-favorite enemy of the objectivist-is pragmatic not about theory (in the practice-specific
sense) but about philosophy; that is to say, his pragmatism is no threat to quantum physics, for example,
but is a repudiation of certain philosophical attempts to hook quantum physics onto something called
"the world" or "the nature of reality."
68. POSNER, supra note 2, at 263-64.
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possible what is going on in a practice: we try to state the rules of the
game, knowing that without the game there are no rules. And when
practicing, we sometimes do our best only by, among other things,
forgetting the kinds of doubt and uncertainty possible in the philosophical
realm. Strong theorists-those who confuse specific theorizing with non-
specific theorizing-think that practices flow from theories, and therefore
that they need to bolster the law's objective security philosophically.
Strong therapists think, by contrast, that theories flow from practices, and
therefore that they need to construct theories of indeterminacy, institutional
forces, and social pragmatism.
Once we break the strong connection between these realms, howev-
er-once we see the obscuring force of philosophy-the fork disappears.
We should then be able to stop scratching where it does not itch. Of
course, what we find is that even the best therapists, the ones who counsel
leaving philosophy behind, cannot in fact leave it because their counsels are
themselves philosophical. Self-contradiction may threaten; or else they are
left remarking (like Rorty) that their general theoretical speaking is just
another practice or (like Fish) that it is just something some lucky few of
us get to do for a living-"nice work if you can get it." But the issue is not
even as pressing as it appears. Philosophy has always also been meta-
philosophy: reflection on the nature of reality is perforce reflection on the
possibility of such reflection. Pragmatists like Rorty and Fish, like other
"end of philosophy" or "against theory" thinkers, are merely continuing a
long and honorable tradition.
Does this observation mean, as Fish is keen to maintain, that theory
simply doesn't matter? Fish's views on the issue have certainly contributed
to a small but vocal anti-theoretical pragmatism in some recent legal and
literary theory.69 And in the sense that no philosophical theory, however
knock-down, will by itself alter a practice as complex as law, he is right.
But in the sense that our philosophical commitments will alter how we
view practices, and what status we grant the products of those practices, he
is wrong. Pledging philosophical allegiance is not merely, as he suggests,
of rhetorical importance. Finding no sanction for thinking a legal
interpretation objective in the strong sense will certainly alter how we view
our imprisonment in the county jail, for example, though it will not change
the fact that we are prisoners. Furthermore, future acts of interpretation
and lawmaking will certainly be shaped by philosophical views concerning
the status of the acts of interpreters and lawmakers. In short, philosophy,
69. See, e.g., AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM (W.J.T. Mitchell
ed., 1985); see also Steven Knapp & Walter B. Michaels, Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and
Deconstruction, 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 49-68 (1987). Of course, philosophical pragmatism is itself a
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theory, and practice are on discrete levels, and there is no straightforward
or precise-no axiological-relation between them. But there is a relation,
and one of the purposes of philosophy is to try to discern it.
Where does this leave us with regard to the analogy question? As
always, literature seems more tolerant of diversity and ambiguity.
Competing theories of literature do not seem to cause the same outrage
among literary theorists that competing theories of law cause among legal
theorists. This difference may be a question of training, since many legal
theorists are lawyers, not philosophers, and so may be less inclined to face
vertiginous epistemological possibilities. If we were to introduce non-
professorial readers of literature into the theoretical debates, we would
quickly see similar confusion, reaction, and objection to antirealist or
indeterminist theories. (Indeed, such a reaction was evident when a trend
for theoretical innovation caused some elements of literary theory to trickle
down into general reader consciousness.) In both realms, we can no more
vouchsafe validity in advance than we can specify the rules of a complex
game. To say that literary interpretation is more given to diversity than
legal interpretation is to say something about a difference in goal, but it
does not get us very far because it does not say what counts as acceptable
diversity in either realm. We are left wondering if it is a difference in
degree or in kind, or indeed whether those are the only choices. We are
left, in other words, with all the interesting questions still unanswered.
I suggested at the beginning that the answer to the analogy question
would be that law is utterly like literature, utterly unlike it, and that it
hardly matters. Law is utterly like literature because it consists of written
texts that are subject to interpretation. To the extent that a general theory
of interpretation is valid-a limited but very important extent-law and
literature are two instances of the same human activity: divining meaning
from written artifacts. But law is utterly unlike literature in that the
practices governed by its texts have quite different goals. This difference
may mean that the texts themselves have a different character, but that
claim is often misstated. There is no metaphysical or essential difference
at work here: law and literature are not different in any "deep" (which is
to say, practice-independent) manner. Attempts to identify such a
difference, and answers to the analogy question based on such a difference,
just foster confusion. The issue hardly matters, finally, in that the general
theory of interpretation-and theory generally--does not have a locked-in
relationship with practices of interpretation. Theory can affect practice, and
vice versa, but why and how much are questions that cannot be answered
in advance and in general-that is, philosophically.
So we do not need to stifle the theoretical urge. By the same token, the
therapeutic urge should be seen accurately as itself an attempt to "get it
right" with respect to practices. We are still philosophizing, like it or not,
when we advance strong practice-based accounts of interpretation. The
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more self-aware our efforts become, however, the more disappointing they
may appear. In this, we cannot except the present effort. It too leaves all
the hard questions unanswered, postponed to the practices themselves,
where they belong, and so leaves the strong theoretical urge unsatisfied.
We cannot say what a valid literary interpretation will be. Likewise, we
cannot say what a valid legal one will be. And though we can say that
their respective answers will be different, we cannot, beyond articulating
some features of the practices, say of what that difference consists, for there
is no essence of the difference to be discerned.
I suggested at the beginning that this disappointment concerning the law-
and-literature analogy would itself be instructive. Seeing our limits is a
crucial aspect of seeing ourselves, and our practices, clearly. I can now
say, in true philosophical fashion, that I told you so.
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